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think of peer reviewers the way that 
statues think of pigeons. But peer 
review, as Winston Churchill said 
of democracy, is the worst form of 
assessment except for all the others 
that have been tried. It is still a very 
imperfect method. Some scientists 
transform from Jekyll into Hyde when 
they switch roles from author to peer 
reviewer. I know because I have read 
what they write. I just don’t know who 
they are.
Any favourite authors? There is a 
wealth of excellent books on the brain 
nowadays. For neurology, I like Oliver 
Sacks, of course, but also the less 
well known but extremely readable 
Harold Klawans. And for imaginative 
fiction there is nobody to beat V.S. 
Ramachandran. Other authors I like 
include Vincent Dethier (To know a 
Fly), Kenneth Roeder (Nerve Cells & 
Insect Behavior); Richard Gregory, 
Colin Blakemore, Matt Ridley and 
Daniel Dennett (anything by them). 
My two favourite Hungarian writers 
are the brilliant Georg Von Bekesy 
(hearing) and Bela Julesz (vision). 
My favourite Darwinians, apart from 
Darwin, are Richard Dawkins and 
Stephen Jay Gould — why did they 
argue so much when they were 95% 
in agreement? — and Christopher 
Wills.
I have a predictive test for good 
writers. When I reach the bottom of 
a page that ends in mid-sentence, 
I mentally complete the sentence 
before I turn the page. Then I turn 
over and see if the writer finished his 
sentence better than I did. Usually 
he does. I wish I could reverse this 
process and have a committee of 
these writers finish my sentences 
for me. What an improvement that 
would be.
Is there a scientific method? 
There are many. Different scientists 
have different styles of research 
and we need all of them: instead of 
one royal road, there is a network 
of broad avenues and narrow alleys 
leading to the truth. The Germans 
macaronically say Fast Research, 
Fast Richtig, but this is nicht 
immer true. Some scientists take a 
perverse pride in working rapidly, but 
unravelling a single molecule can be 
a major achievement taking half a 
lifetime; ask Fred Sanger. I have been 
impressed by the role of random 
events in scientific discovery. For 
instance, as a new graduate student 
I spent weeks building a power 
supply that made a lamp brighten 
very gradually. When I switched the 
lamp to a steady state, it appeared 
to grow gradually dimmer. I spent a 
day in the repair shop trying to fix my 
power supply, before I realised I had 
stumbled across (= discovered) a new 
visual aftereffect, which I published 
in Science as my first research paper. 
Pasteur noted that fortune favours 
the prepared mind. I’ve found it can 
favour the unprepared mind too.
What trends do you see in 
neuroscience and visual science? 
Fashions come and go in science. 
People go to conferences, or 
read papers, and get inspired to 
do likewise. This makes research 
converge on common topics, leading 
to schooling behaviour in which 
vision scientists copy each other, 
first studying prism adaptation, then 
Fourier synthesis and the perception 
of sinusoidal gratings, and nowadays 
face perception. In neuroscience 
there has been a frenzied rush to 
brain scans. It is said that if you 
want a grant these days, it pays to 
include some fMRI experiments. But 
these are only worth doing if they 
are inspired by creative ideas. There 
are many mundane experiments that 
simply “unpack God’s suitcase”, 
telling us whether He packed the 
trousers on top of the jacket or vice 
versa. Who cares? Yet some of the 
most interesting studies of brain 
plasticity or reorganisation simply 
could not be done without brain 
scans. For instance, Alvaro Pascual-
Leone discovered that when sighted 
people are blindfolded for five days, 
reading Braille with their fingertips 
makes their visual cortex light up, 
and injecting electric pulses into this 
brain region through the skull can 
disrupt their ability to read Braille. 
These effects disappear when the 
blindfolds are removed. This exciting 
research suggests profound but 
rapidly reversible changes in brain 
organisation. 
But there will always be, I hope, 
a central role for old-fashioned 
perceptual experiments such as I do, 
which measure our visual abilities and 
tell the neuroscientists where to look.
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Why study pig cognition? “The work 
of teaching and organising the others 
fell naturally upon the pigs, who were 
generally recognised as being the 
cleverest of the animals.” George 
Orwell, in Animal Farm, summarises 
a widely held suspicion that it is pigs 
that are the most astute, wily, and 
even devious, of our farm species. 
Look a pig in the eye and you may 
be forgiven for thinking that there is 
a person peering back at you from 
behind a mask. There is something 
about that human-looking eye, the 
alert, inquisitive, responsive behaviour, 
and the hairless body, that intrigues 
us and elicits a feeling of familiarity 
and even equality. Pigs are indeed 
physiologically similar to humans, but 
what about their cognitive abilities? 
Do pigs live up to Orwell’s billing? 
These questions are of interest not 
only in order to establish the truth 
about popular portrayals of pig 
intelligence, but also because pigs are 
a major source of food. In 2008, the 
Food and Agricultural Organization 
estimates that there were some 941 
million domestic pigs worldwide, kept 
in conditions ranging from outdoor 
pasture or woodland to intensive 
indoor farms where breeding sows 
live in metal crates that allow them 
to stand up and lie down, but do little 
else. Understanding pig cognition 
may tell us how different housing 
conditions impact on their mental 
state, and suggest management 
procedures that take account of 
their cognitive capacities in order to 
minimise stress and enhance welfare.
How do pigs behave in the wild? 
Common agricultural breeds such 
as the Landrace, rare breeds like the 
Gloucester Old Spot, and specially 
bred laboratory strains such as the 
Göttingen minipig are all domestic 
pigs descended from the Eurasian 
wild boar (Sus scrofa). The behaviour 
and social organisation of feral 
domestic pigs is much like that of 
the ancestral species. Pigs live in 




five females with their young offspring 
and, during the breeding season, an 
adult male. Yearlings may continue 
to associate with the group but male 
offspring usually disperse to form 
‘bachelor’ groups. Family groups 
forage together for food that is 
distributed patchily both in space and 
time. Given this social lifestyle, pigs 
would likely benefit from being able 
to discriminate between group mates 
and unfamiliar intruders, remember 
the location and attributes of food 
patches, use others as a source of 
information about where food is, and 
even conceal information about a food 
source from potential competitors. So, 
what do we actually know about these 
and other cognitive abilities in the 
domestic pig?
Can pigs tell each other apart? 
When unfamiliar pigs are mixed 
together (as happens regularly on pig 
farms), they fight vigorously, causing 
welfare and production problems. This 
behaviour likely reflects an evolved 
tendency to deter intruders from 
abruptly entering the family group, 
and indicates that pigs discriminate 
group-mates from non-group-mates. 
However, it does not tell us how 
sophisticated their discrimination 
abilities are. In recent research, pigs 
have been trained to discriminate 
between individuals for a food reward. 
They can do this even when they are 
unfamiliar with the individuals and 
the individuals themselves are litter-
mates and hence presumably quite 
difficult to tell apart. Some pigs can 
discriminate even when only provided 
with cues in one sensory modality 
(smell, appearance, or sound). 
Although these findings indicate 
that pigs can tell individuals apart, it 
remains to be discovered whether this 
ability reflects a cognitive concept of 
other individuals as distinct entities 
characterised by a cluster of physical 
and behavioural characteristics. 
It is also unclear how long pigs 
remember others for. According to 
some studies this could be three 
to six weeks or more, but these are 
based on observations of aggressive 
behaviour when previous group-mates 
are re-united, and such aggression 
may or may not occur for a variety 
of reasons, including re-establishing 
social order between recognised 
individuals, variation in the aggressive 
‘personalities’ of individuals, and 
actual forgetting of another individual. 
Studies using specific measures 
of social recognition are needed to 
properly establish how long pigs 
remember others for.
Pigs in space... As their behaviour 
in the wild would predict, pigs have 
good spatial cognitive abilities. For 
example, in a spatial memory task 
involving twice daily visits to an arena 
containing several potential food sites, 
they rapidly learn to find where food is 
hidden during the first visit of the day, 
and to remember and return to the 
same location for more food on the 
second visit, some minutes or hours 
later. Whilst pigs readily learn to return 
to a site which they have recently 
depleted of food — a ‘win-stay’ 
strategy which is beneficial under 
captive conditions due to repeated 
provision of food at the same place — 
when given the opportunity they, like 
many species, show a preference 
for a ‘win-shift’ foraging strategy 
(avoiding sites where they have 
recently fed). This facilitates efficient 
searching, avoiding revisits. Pigs can 
also learn the locations of two sites 
containing different amounts of food, 
and preferentially return to the one of 
greater value.
Exploitative and deceptive pigs? 
Equipped with well-developed abilities 
for remembering where food patches 
are, pigs augment these by using 
group-mates as further sources of 
information about the location of food. 
This has been studied using a variant 
of the foraging arena task mentioned 
above, in which pigs forage in pairs 
(Figure 1). One ‘informed’ (I) pig 
knows the location of food (having 
searched the arena a few minutes 
previously), while its larger ‘non-
informed’ (NI) companion simply 
knows that food is somewhere in 
the arena, but not where. Each pair 
of pigs forages together daily (each 
day the food is hidden at a randomly 
selected location). Initially the I pig 
goes straight to the food, while its 
NI companion searches locations 
systematically, and occasionally 
bumps into the I pig chomping away 
at the baited site. After some days, 
most NI pigs start to follow their 
pair-mates, having apparently learned 
that the I pig knows something they 
don’t. NI pigs thus make use of their 
partner’s knowledge and, because 
they are larger, exploit this knowledge 
by displacing them from the food. 
After more days of this foraging 
arms-race, many of the I pigs develop 
behaviours that might allow them to 
overcome exploitation. They tend 
to turn towards or actually go to the 
baited site only when their NI pair-
mate is either some distance away, 
moving away from the food, or out 
of sight (behind a barrier). I pigs also 
suppress their preference for first 
visiting the larger of two food sources 
when they are with an exploiting 
companion. Interestingly, they don’t 
do this when with a non-exploiting 
companion, further indicating quite 
subtle social discrimination abilities. 
The I pigs’ apparently deceptive 
behaviour is similar to that observed in 
chimpanzees, Mangabey monkeys and 
ravens. Maybe they intend to deceive 
their companion, understanding their 
exploitative intentions and how to 
overcome them; pigs might indeed be 
as devious as Orwell painted them. 
Another explanation, however, is 
that I pigs learn that if they visit the 
Figure 1. Studying competitive foraging in the domestic pig. 
Pigs are trained and tested daily in a foraging arena. (A) In the first trial of the day, a pig forages 
and finds the location of food for that day. (B) In the second trial of the day, the ‘informed’ pig is 
re-introduced into the arena with its companion who does not know where food is. Over repeated 
trials the behaviour of the two pigs changes as firstly the companion learns to follow the informed 
pig to the food, and then the informed pig develops behaviours which minimise the chances of the 
companion exploiting its knowledge. Adapted with permission from Mendl and Nicol (2009). 
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baited site when the NI pig is in view, 
coming towards them, or close by, 
they will usually be unceremoniously 
barged out of the way. They therefore 
suppress movements towards the 
food in these circumstances. The 
resulting behaviour appears deceptive, 
but it is the result of associative 
learning, rather than so-called ‘higher 
level’ understanding of the intentions 
of others. Unfortunately, these studies 
don’t yet allow us to conclude which 
explanation is the correct one. 
Really clever pigs? So, pigs can 
show sophisticated social behaviour, 
but is there any evidence of a truly 
powerful primate, corvid, cetacean 
or elephantine-like mind behind this? 
Recent findings are intriguing. Pigs 
with experience of a mirror move 
away from the reflection of a food 
bowl and around a barrier to get to 
the bowl, rather than looking behind 
the mirror as mirror-naive subjects 
do. This indicates that they can learn 
about the visio-spatial properties of 
mirrors and use them to guide their 
behaviour in appropriate ways. No 
tests of mirror self-recognition, used 
to assess the possibility that animals 
have a self-concept, have been carried 
out, but there is clearly potential for 
such studies. Having a self-concept 
is thought to be a pre-requisite for a 
‘theory of mind’ — the understanding 
that other individuals have mental 
states and knowledge like oneself. The 
ability to take the visual perspective of 
others may be one indicator of theory 
of mind. 
In a tightly-controlled study, one 
out of 10 pigs showed behaviour 
consistent with understanding that one 
of its companions had witnessed the 
location of a food-baiting event and 
hence knew where food was, while 
its other companion who, like itself, 
was shielded from the food-baiting 
event by an opaque barrier, had no 
such knowledge. Most of the other 
pigs refused to follow either potential 
informant, and, although one success 
out of ten is perhaps not convincing 
and there are alternative, if tortuous, 
explanations, it remains possible that 
the single pig genuinely demonstrated 
visual perspective taking. Another 
ability thought, until recently, to be 
uniquely human is the capacity for 
episodic memory — remembering 
what happened where and when. 
A recent study suggests that minipigs 
may be able to remember what object 
was encountered where, and in which 
context, indicating possible episodic-
like memory in this species. 
What implications do studies 
of pig cognition have for an 
understanding of their welfare? The 
relationship between cognitive ability 
and the potential for suffering is not 
straightforward. For example, if pigs 
do have episodic memory and future 
planning abilities, this will help them to 
predict potential challenges and plan 
appropriate action, but also render 
them vulnerable to anxiety about the 
future, and memory of unpleasant 
events. More fundamentally, it 
is unclear how the capacity for 
conscious suffering is related to 
cognitive (information processing) 
ability. Although species with a self 
concept may be self conscious, 
allowing them to experience “I feel 
pain”, suffering may be just as great in 
species that possess only phenomenal 
or feelings consciousness — 
conscious awareness of basic 
emotions and sensations — and 
experience “this is painful”. It is 
not obvious why phenomenal 
consciousness, the key attribute 
that enables suffering and hence 
poor welfare, should be restricted to 
species capable of complex cognitive 
feats. 
If we assume that pigs possess 
phenomenal consciousness, studies 
of cognition can help us identify 
situations in which they may suffer, 
and management procedures that 
minimise these. For example, pigs 
can learn associations between 
visual cues and the duration of a 
subsequent period of confinement. 
These time-perception abilities could 
be utilised by signalling the duration 
of upcoming husbandry procedures, 
hence increasing their predictability 
and reducing their aversiveness. 
Our understanding of the social 
skills of pigs suggests that, given 
the opportunity, they can resolve 
conflicts in subtle ways rather than by 
damaging fights. Preliminary studies 
indicate that, when pigs are given time 
to assess each other through a barrier 
prior to being mixed, this does indeed 
reduce subsequent aggression.
Whilst our understanding of pig 
cognition is at an early stage, the 
complexity of pig behaviour is already 
evident, indicating sophisticated 
associative learning abilities and, 
although more evidence is needed, 
perhaps the capacity for episodic 
memory, intentional deception and 
even theory of mind. Even if these 
latter abilities are not present, it seems 
unlikely that pigs will be fulfilled by a 
life spent standing up and lying down 
in a metal crate. One way forward may 
be the use of ‘cognitive enrichment’ 
to enhance quality of life, and it is 
encouraging that providing pigs with 
cognitive tasks has recently been 
shown to reduce abnormal behaviour, 
decrease fearfulness, speed up 
wound healing, and even alter gene 
expression in reward-sensitive 
opioidergic systems in the brain. 
Allowing pigs to use their cognitive 
talents appears to be an important 
way of enhancing their welfare. 
Where can I find out more?
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